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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Norman Ortiz-Perez timely appeals the Judgment of Conviction wherein the 
district court imposed upon him a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, 
following his conviction for domestic violence in the presence of a child, and concurrent 
sentences of one year for malicious injury to property and concealing a dangerous 
weapon. Mr. Ortiz-Perez assets that the district court erred when it admitted the 
booking photo over his objection; approved admission of highly prejudicial evidence 
about Ms. Wardle's belief that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had been using methamphetamines for 
months leading up to their separation; authorized hearsay about whether Mr. Ortiz-
Perez possessed a concealed weapons permit; and, failed to grant a judgment of 
acquittal on the concealing a dangerous weapon charge. Assuming arguendo that none 
of the errors individually rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts 
the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez and Ms. Wardle fought over accusations of cheating. On 
November 12, 2010, Ms. Wardle decided to go out to the Ranch Club to celebrate her 
friend's birthday. (Tr., p.279, L.20-p.280, L.2.) She went to the bar without Mr. Ortiz-
Perez. (Tr., p.281, Ls.16-17.) However, he showed up later and slapped Ms. Wardle. 
(Tr., p.2587, Ls.5-8, p.290, Ls.9-12.) Ms. Wardle eventually left and went to her 
mother's house. (Tr., p.290, Ls.16-22.) The dispute continued into the next day. 
(Tr., p.298, Ls.11-18.) 
The next day, Mr. Ortiz-Perez went to Ms. Wardle's mother's home. (Tr., p.300, 
Ls.9-14.) Ms. Wardle accused Mr. Ortiz-Perez of kicking her in the face and head 
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several times in the front of her two children. (Tr., p.304, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Wardle did 
have a small scratch on her face, among other marks. (Exhibit 47; Tr., p.311, Ls.9-13.) 
After arranging for her friend to pick up the older daughter, Ms. Wardle called the police 
to report the incident. (Tr., p.313, L.20-p.315, L.14.) 
The police drove to Ms. Wardle's home and discovered that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had 
damaged some property in the home. (Tr., p.541, Ls.6-16.) Mr. Ortiz-Perez admitted at 
trial that he had caused the damage to the property.1 (Tr., p.710, Ls.4-11.) When the 
officers found Mr. Ortiz-Perez, they discovered that he carried a knife on his belt. 
(Tr., p.536, Ls.15-20.) 
For months, Ms. Wardle had lied to the prosecutor about being at the Ranch 
Club, in fear that it would violate her probation. (Tr., p.380, L.15-p.387, L.22.) She also 
had denied that Mr. Ortiz-Perez slapped her there. (Tr., p.380, L.15-p.387, L.22.) After 
a picture had been discovered by Mr. Ortiz-Perez, Ms. Wardle admitted that she had 
lied about being at the Ranch Club. (Tr., p.380, L.15-p.387, L.22.) 
The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Ortiz-Perez by Information with the crimes 
of domestic violence in the presence of a child, malicious injury to property, concealing 
a dangerous weapon, and unlawful entry. (R., pp.31-34.) The State filed pre-trial 
motion to allow testimony that Mr. Ortiz-Perez admitted that he had drugs on him at the 
time of his arrest. (R., pp.183-185; Tr.08/10/2010, p.4, L.17-p.5, L.3.) The State 
wanted to use this admission to prove Ms. Wardle's credibility because the State 
believed that Mr. Ortiz-Perez would argue that there was an unreasonable delay in 
calling the police. (R., pp.183-185.) The State recognized the prejudicial effect of the 
1 The district court would not allow Mr. Ortiz-Perez to plead guilty to the malicious injury 
to property charges prior to trial in order to have the evidence not discussed during the 
trial. (Tr., p.50, Ls.4-17.) 
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evidence; however, it reasoned that the probative value was outweighed by any 
prejudicial effect, and the court could provide a limiting instruction to limit the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence. (R., pp.183-185.) The district court postponed ruling on the 
motion, noting that the evidence would not come in the case in chief. (Tr.08/1 0/201 0, 
p.10, Ls.20-25.) 
During trial, the State requested to introduce evidence that the parties were 
fighting about Mr. Ortiz-Perez's alleged drug activity, arguing that Mr. Ortiz-Perez 
opened the door during his cross of Ms. Wardle. (Tr., p.399, L.10-pAOO, L.i5.) 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez argued that he did not open any doors by conducting a cross-
examination on the issues that the prosecutor had introduced at trial. (Tr., pA02, Ls.i7-
19, pA03, Ls.7-i0.) Mr. Ortiz-Perez also argued that the evidence was overly 
prejudicial. (Tr., pA03, L.11-pA04, L.2.) 
Initially, the court held that because Mr. Ortiz-Perez cross-examined Mrs. Wardle 
about the parties' fight, he opened the door to allow the information that the fight was 
allegedly about Mr. Ortiz-Perez's alleged drug activity. (Tr., pAOO, Ls.19-21, pAOO, 
L.23-pA01, L.5.) Additionally, the district court felt that the alleged admission that 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez had drugs in his car would be admissible because it made Ms. Wardle's 
claim that she delayed calling the police because Mr. Ortiz-Perez's threaten to have 
Ms. Wardle's probation more believable. (Tr., pA01, Ls.6-11.) 
After reviewing the trial testimony, the district court found that the challenged 
testimony would be admissible because it demonstrated Ms. Wardle's credibility, which 
was the focal point of the trial. (Tr., pA08, Ls.2-7.) The State was allowed to introduce 
evidence that he threatened to put dope on her and the parties had been fighting 
because of Mr. Ortiz-Perez's drug activity of doing drugs. (Tr., pA11, L.20-pA12, L.i.) 
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During the trial, over Mr. Ortiz-Perez's objection, the court authorized the 
admission of Mr. Ortiz-Perez's arrest photo. (Tr., p.576, L.24-p.578, L.14.) Although 
identification was not an issue at trial, the court allowed the photo because the State 
claimed that Mr. Ortiz-Perez looked a little different. (Tr., p.576, L.24-p.578, L.14.) 
The court also authorized, over Mr. Ortiz-Perez's objection, the admission of a 
police officer's hearsay within hearsay testimony about whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez 
possessed a concealed weapon permit. (Tr., p.567, L.15-p.568, L.3.) The officer 
testified about what another officer had not learned from dispatch. (Tr., p.567, L.15-
p.568, L.3.) Dispatch had not informed the arresting officer that Mr. Ortiz-Perez 
possessed a concealed weapons permit and, therefore, the district court denied the 
motion for directed verdict, finding that a jury could find that the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt no permit existed. (Tr., p.663, L.16-p.667, L.13.) 
The jury found Mr. Ortiz-Perez guilty of the crimes of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, malicious injury to property, and concealing a dangerous weapon. 
(R., pp.259-261.) The jury acquitted Mr. Ortiz-Perez of the unlawful entry charge. 
(R., p.262.) The district court ordered a presentence report and a domestic violence 
evaluation. (Tr., p.734, L.22-p.735, LA; R., pp.263-264.) The district court imposed 
upon Mr. Ortiz-Perez a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, for his 
conviction of domestic violence in the presence of a child. (Tr., p.787, Ls.15-16.) In 
addition, the district court imposed upon Mr. Ortiz-Perez concurrent unified sentences of 
one year on the malicious injury to property and concealing a dangerous weapon 
convictions. (Tr., p.787, Ls.16-21.) Mr. Ortiz-Perez timely filed his appeal (R., pp.290-
293) from the Judgment of Conviction (R., pp.280-285). 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err when it admitted state's exhibit 53, the arrest photo of 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez, over the objection of defense counsel, as such testimony was 
not relevant for the jury's consideration? 
2) Did the district court err when it allowed the State to admit evidence that 
Ms. Wardle suspected that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had been using drugs, 
methamphetamine, for several months? 
3) Did the district court err when it allowed a police officer to offer hearsay evidence 
about the non-existence of a concealed weapons permit? 
4) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ortiz-Perez motion for directed verdict 
on count three, carrying a concealed weapon, because insufficient evidence 
existed to prove the material element that Mr. Ortiz-Perez did not have a 
concealed weapons permit? 
5) Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Ortiz-Perez's right to a fair trial 
denied as a result of the accumulation of serious errors throughout his trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted State's Exhibit 53, The Arrest Photo Of 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez, Over The Objection Of Defense Counsel, As Such Testimony Was Not 
Relevant For the Jury's Consideration 
A. Introduction 
The jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez committed the crime of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. Over the objection of defense counsel, the 
district court admitted State's Exhibit 53, the arrest photo of Mr. Ortiz-Perez. The district 
court erred in admitting this exhibit and the testimony related to it as it was irrelevant as 
to any disputed issue at trial. Furthermore, Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the State will be 
unable to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The Arrest Photo Was Not Relevant For The Jury's Consideration In Determining 
Whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez Committed The Alleged Crimes; Therefore, The District 
Court Erred In Allowing Such Evidence To Be Presented To The Jury 
"'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. "All 
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other 
rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." I.R.E. 402. The question of whether evidence is relevant is subject to de 
novo review by the appellate Court. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,819 (1998). Where 
alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that 
a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States 
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Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
The Idaho Supreme Court first addressed whether a person's mugshot was 
proper evidence at trial when it decided State v. Cunningham, 97 Idaho 650 (1976). In 
Cunningham, the State offered the mugshot to prove an extra judicial identification of 
the defendant. Id. at 653. Additionally, the mugshot showed a change in appearance 
from the time the photo had been taken to the time of the trial. Id. The Cunningham 
Court noted that the district court gave a special limiting instruction. Id. The 
Cunningham Court found no error in admitting the mugshot. Id. 
In State v. Carter, the Idaho Supreme Court again found relevance in the 
admission of the defendant's mugshot. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 921-22, new 
trial granted, 108 Idaho 788 (1981). The Carter Court noted that the defendant had 
significantly changed his appearance and the picture would explain the witness' 
testimony about why she didn't like the defendant due to his appearance. Id. at 922. In 
the picture the defendant had long hair and a beard; however, by the time of trial, the 
defendant had cut his hair and shaved his beard. Id. Therefore, the mugshot picture 
provided some relevance to the testimony being offered by the witness. Id. 
In both Carter and Cunningham, the State demonstrated some need for the 
mugshot. Carter, 103 Idaho at 921 (the defendant had opened the door by introducing 
the victim's mug shot and putting the victim's appearance at issue and the State moved 
for admission of the defendant's mugshot for the same purpose); Cunningham, 97 
Idaho at 653 (mugshot used to prove the extra judicial identification of the defendant). 
In the instant case, identification was not an issue and the State failed to demonstrate 
any relevance allowing the picture to be placed into evidence. 
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Boise City Police Officer, Jacob Norman, responded to MsV's 911 telephone call 
to investigate domestic battery. (Tr., p.551, Ls.8-15.) During his testimony, the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q. And so when you transported him to the jail, is that the Ada County 
Jail? 
A. It is. 
Q. Was he booked into jail then that afternoon? 
A. He was. 
(State's Exhbit No. 53 marked for identification.) 
Q. BY MS. BUTTRAM: I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
State's Exhibit 53. Do you recognize State's Exhibit 53? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is it - or how is it that you recognize it, I guess? 
A. It's a photo of the defendant, Norman, on the date of his arrest. 
Q. Is that a fair and accurate depiction then of what he looked like that 
afternoon when you arrested him? 
A. It is. 
MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, I move to admit State's Exhibit 53 into 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BRIGGS: I guess I fail to see any relevance. I mean, he's been 
identified by every witness that he is Norman Ortiz-Perez. 
THE COURT: What's the relevance of the picture? 
MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, he looks a little bit differently today than he 
did at the time he has been identified by the witnesses, but I think that the 
jurors will be able to see what he looked like that day as well. 
THE COURT: Then I'm going to admit it for that limited purpose. 
MS. BUTTRAM: If I could get that back, we'll show that to the jury. 
Q. BY MS. BUTTRAM: So this what he looked like that afternoon when 
you arrested him? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.576, L.24-p.578, L.14.) 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the above testimony was not relevant because it did 
not have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
testimony. The jury simply did not need to consider how Mr. Ortiz-Perez looked the 
night of his arrest. The district court erred in allowing such testimony to be submitted to 
the jury. 
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C. The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Error Was 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
"If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, 
appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman [v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)]. Where the defendant meets his initial burden of 
showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the 
appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry at 227. The State was allowed to present 
irrelevant evidence in an attempt to bias the jury against Mr. Ortiz-Perez. The State will 
be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, this information did not weigh on the 
conscience of the jurors in determining Mr. Ortiz-Perez's guilt and did not contribute to 
the verdict. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed the State To Admit Evidence That Ms. Wardle 
Suspected That Mr. Ortiz-Perez Had Been Using Drugs, Methamphetamine, For 
Several Months 
A. Introduction 
The jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez committed the crime of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. Over the objection of defense counsel, the 
district court authorized the State to solicit testimony from Ms. Wardle's that she 
believed Mr. Ortiz-Perez had been using drugs, specifically methamphetamine, for 
several months prior to the incident. The district court erred in allowing this testimony 
as it was overly prejudicial. Furthermore, Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the State will be 
unable to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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B. The District Court Erred In Admitting Ms. Wardle's Testimony About Mr. Ortiz-
Perez's Alleged Drug Use 
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact of 
consequence to the litigation more probable or less probable, and such evidence is 
generally admissible. I.R.E. 401,402. However, 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible 
for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on 
a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same 
I.R.E. 404(a). Additionally, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident ... 
I.R.E. 404(b). "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. 
A court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). An appellate court reviewing a district court's 
discretionary decision engages in a three-part analysis: First, whether the district court 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; second, whether the court acted within 
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and 
third, whether the court reached is decision through an exercise of reason. State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
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In deciding whether to admit evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), the district court must 
first determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the alleged crime, 
wrong, or act actually occurred. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (citations omitted). If so, the 
court must then determine whether the fact of the crime, wrong, or act would be relevant 
to a material and disputed issue, other than the defendant's character or criminal 
propensity. Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the court must determine whether the danger 
of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Id. (citations omitted). 
During trial, the State requested to introduce evidence that the parties were 
fighting about Mr. Ortiz-Perez's alleged drug activity. (Tr., p.399, L.10-p.400, L.15.) 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez argued that he did not open any doors by conducting a cross-
examination on the issues that the prosecutor had introduced at trial. (Tr., p.402, LS.17-
19, p.403, Ls.7-10.) Mr. Ortiz-Perez also argued that the evidence was overly 
prejudicial. (Tr., p.403, L.11-p.404, L.2.) 
Initially, the court held that because Mr. Ortiz-Perez cross-examined Mrs. Wardle 
about the parties' fight, he opened the door to allow the information about what the fight 
was allegedly about, which was Mr. Ortiz-Perez's alleged drug activity. (Tr., p.400, 
Ls.19-21, p.400, L.23-p.401, L.5.) Additionally, the district court felt that the alleged 
admission that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had drugs in his car was going to be admissible because 
it made Ms. Wardle's statement that she delayed calling the police because Mr. Ortiz-
Perez's threat to have Ms. Wardle's probation more believable. (Tr., p.401, Ls.6-11.) 
After reviewing the trial testimony, the district court found that the challenged 
testimony would be admissible because it demonstrated Ms. Wardle's credibility, which 
was the focal point of the trial. (Tr., p.40S, Ls.2-7.) The State presented evidence that 
he threatened to put dope on her and the parties had been fighting because of 
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Mr. Ortiz-Perez's drug activity of doing drugs. (Tr., p.411, L.20-p.412, L.1.) The district 
court erred in admitting the evidence. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Error Was 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
"If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, 
appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman [v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)]. Where the defendant meets his initial burden of 
showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the 
appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry at 227. The State was allowed to present overly 
prejudicial evidence in an attempt to bias the jury against Mr. Ortiz-Perez. The State 
will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, this information did not weigh on 
the conscience of the jurors in determining Mr. Ortiz-Perez's guilt and did not contribute 
to the verdict. 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed A Police Officer To Offer Hearsay Evidence 
About The Non-Existence Of A Concealed Weapons Permit 
A. Introduction 
The jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez committed the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. Over the objection of defense counsel, 
the State was allowed to offer testimony from one officer about what another officer had 
not learned from dispatch. Allegedly, dispatch did not reveal that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had a 
concealed weapon permit and, therefore, he did not possess the necessary permit. The 
district court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Ortiz-Perez 
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asserts that the State will be unable to show that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
before them. Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135 (2000). Therefore, the reviewing 
Court will only disturb a trial court's discretion to admit evidence upon a clear showing of 
abuse. State v. Sando val-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911 (2003). Where an alleged error is 
followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation 
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010). 
C. The District Court Erred In Allowing An Officer To Testify About The Non-
Existence Of A Concealed Weapons Permit In Violation Of The Hearsay Rules 
"The State bears the burden of proving that a person ... is not licensed to carry 
a concealed weapon." State v. Morales, 127 Idaho 951, 954 (Ct. App. 1996). "Upon 
issuing a license under the provisions of this section, the sheriff will notify the Idaho 
State Police on a form or in a manner prescribed by the state police." I.C. §18-
3302(1 )(n). The Morales Court noted that proving that a person failed to have a permit 
to carry a concealed weapon was an integral part of the offense and, therefore, a 
material element of the crime. Morales, 127 Idaho at 954. Thus, in order to prove a 
criminal violation, the prosecution could elicit testimony from the custodian of the 
concealed weapons permit at the Idaho State Police that the defendant did not have a 
concealed weapon permit on file. See id. In the instant case, the State failed to meet 
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its burden of proof because it improperly relied upon hearsay evidence to prove its 
case. 
"The Idaho Rules of Evidence define hearsay as 'a statement [oral or written], 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'" State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 
423 (2009) (quoting Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho at 911, (quoting I.R.E. 801 (a) and (c))). 
"Hearsay is inadmissible unless otherwise provided by an exception in these rules or 
other rules of the Idaho Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802. Hearsay within hearsay is 
admissible under this rule provided each part of the combined statements falls within an 
exception to the rule. I.R.E 805." State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378 (Ct. App. 1996). 
1. The District Court Erred Authorizing Officer Norman To Offer Hearsay 
Within Hearsay, Without A Valid Exception To The Hearsay Rule, To 
Prove An Essential Element Of The Offense 
The State attempted to prove a material element of the offense, that Mr. Ortiz-
Perez did not possess a concealed license permit, with the testimony of Officer Jacob 
Norman. At trial, Officer Norman testified as follows, 
Q. So did you do that - that running of the information through dispatch in 
this case? 
A. One of my assist officers did. 
Q. And did you become aware of whether or not the defendant had a 
weapon - or a permit to carry a concealed weapon? 
MR. BRIGGS: Judge, I'm going to object. This is hearsay. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule it. 
(Tr., p.S67, L.1S-p.S68, L.3.) 
In its attempt to prove whether Mr. Ortiz-Perez possessed a concealed weapons 
permit, the State offered hearsay testimony to prove the element. The State offered the 
testimony for the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony offered was not only 
hearsay, but also hearsay within hearsay, prohibited by I.R.E. 80S. The officer 
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attempted to testify about information that another officer had received; he also was 
attempted to testify about the information dispatch told the other officer. The State 
provided only one level of exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., I.R.E. 803(7), and failed to 
provide an exception to both components of the hearsay within hearsay. (Tr., p.567, 
Ls.23-24.) The State offered no exception to the general rule against hearsay to allow 
the officer to testify about the other officer's information. The State did attempt to offer 
one level of exception to the hearsay rule which, as will be explained below, was 
inadequate. 
Because Mr. Ortiz-Perez made a contemporaneous objection at trial, the 
appellate court applies the harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The State must demonstrate to the appellate court beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Perry at 227. 
The State was allowed to present hearsay testimony about a material element of the 
charge of concealed weapons violation over Mr. Ortiz-Perez's objection. The State will 
be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, this information did not provide the only 
proof that Mr. Ortiz-Perez failed to have a concealed weapons permit. Because this 
was the only evidence the State relied upon to prove the material element of the 
offense, this Court should find that the State failed to meet its burden of proof and the 
judgment on this charge dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The District Court Erred Authorizing Officer Norman To Offer Hearsay 
Evidence Pursuant To The Business Record Exception Because Officer 
Norman Was Not The Custodian Of The Business Record 
Certain exceptions apply making hearsay statements "admissible because the 
circumstances behind their creation implies a high degree of veracity. Business records 
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are one such legitimate and important classification." Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 
929, 934 (Ct. App. 1988). The business records exception to the hearsay rule reads: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, or acts, events, conditions, 
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, 
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and 
preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
I.R.E. 803(6)(7). 
In State v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that 
I.R.E. 803(6) did not require a foundation of testimony by the person who actually 
prepared the document in order to have it admitted under the mentioned exception, only 
that, "the custodian of the document had knowledge of the system used to make the 
record and not whether the custodian had personal knowledge of the record." Id. at 
761; see also State v. Altman, 122 Idaho 1004, 1007-08 (1992) (holding that records 
need not be authenticated by the person who actually made them, so long as they are 
authenticated by a qualified witness having custody of the record as a regular part of 
her work, or who has supervision of its creation, but finding that the witness was not 
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qualified as she did not supervise the creation of the disputed report) (citing 
Christenson v. Rice, 114 Idaho at 933). 
In the case of Wood v. State Oep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 513 (Ct. App. 
1995), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that I.R.E. 803(6) was inapplicable where the 
custodian of records of CASA, a business entity, was not "the business that prepared 
the letter. Just putting the letter in CASA's files did not transform it into CASA's 
business record within the meaning of I.R.E. 803(6). The author of the letter was not 
called to testify," and additionally, the letter was not kept within the regular course of 
business, as it had been apparently prepared for purposes of the trial. Id. at 520 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Mubita, the Idaho Supreme Court again recognized that "records 
sought to be admitted under the business records exception need not be 
authenticated by the person who made the records". State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 
937-38 (2008). However, the custodian of the business record must authenticate the 
record that it is a "part of the regular course of his or her work or supervision of its 
creation." Id. Mubita argued the there was no evidence that the doctor who received 
and maintained copies of the lab reports created by someone else and that needed to 
be maintained by the doctor for treating patients was in the practice of making 
laboratory results as a regularly conducted business activity. Id. at 938. The Court 
agreed with Mubita in that the records (lab reports) were not produced in the ordinary 
course of the doctor's business. Id. Therefore, the lab reports were not admissible 
under the business record exception. Id. 
No cases appear to have discussed 1.R.E.803(7). However, the plain language 
of the rule appears to be the mechanism to allow the custodian of the records to testify 
17 
to the opposite of what I.R.E. 803(6) allows. In other words, the custodian of the 
business record could testify that no such record exists for the requested item. 
In the instant case, the State offered the following testimony, 
O. BY MS. BUTTRAM: As a matter of your business as a police 
officer, when you make a traffic stop, do you make inquiries through 
dispatch as to the driver or the person that you're going to come in contact 
with? 
A. I typically will run a driver's license check to make a criminal 
history check. 
O. And for what purpose? 
A. To check the validity of their license, to see if they have a 
criminal history. Also lets us know if they're the holder of a concealed 
weapons permit. 
O. And why is that information important to you in your line of 
business? The last part there, if they are -
MR. BRIGGS: Judge, same - same objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: if they are the holder of a valid concealed weapons 
permit, it's something we like to bring up. I see that you have a concealed 
weapons permit. Are there any guns in the car today? You know, 
typically, yes, there are. No, there aren't. Just peace of mind that we like 
to know. Also it can let us know if they've had one or it's expired. 
O. BY MS. BUTTRAM: And is that information that is kept in the 
ordinary course, then, of your work, whether or not someone has a valid 
concealed weapons permit? 
A. Yeah. If they have one, it will be on file with our dispatch and 
they'll let us know. 
O. So did you do that - that running of the information through 
dispatch in this case? 
A. One of my assist officers did. 
O. And did you become aware of whether or not the defendant had 
a weapon - or a permit to carry a concealed weapon? 
MR. BRIGGS: Judge, I'm going to object. This is hearsay. 
MS. BUTTRAM: Your Hon, I think it comes in under 8037. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule it. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, dispatch did not make us aware - or did not 
tell us that he had a valid concealed weapons permit. 
(Tr., p.566, L.9-p.568, L.3.) 
There was no evidence that Officer Norman, a Boise City Police Officer, was the 
custodian of concealed weapons permit. In order to prove the nonexistence of the 
record, the State needed to have the custodian at the Idaho State Police testify that it 
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did not have any record for Mr. Ortiz-Perez. See I.C. § 18-3302(1)(n). No one from the 
records department at the Idaho State Police testified. The State attempted to establish 
that "dispatch" was the custodian of the records; however, whoever "dispatch" was did 
not testify at the trial. Moreover, the State did not provide any evidence that "dispatch" 
is the official custodian of the concealed weapons permit. Finally, the testimony lacked 
trustworthiness because the information was not an affirmative answer to whether 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez possessed a concealed weapons permit, but instead the testimony was 
only that they were not told that he did have a permit. (Tr., p.568, Ls.1-3 ("dispatch did 
not make us aware - or did not tell us that he had a valid concealed weapons permit").) 
Based on the facts at hand, the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the introduction of the testimony by Officer Norman into evidence in the instant 
case. Because Mr. Ortiz-Perez made a contemporaneous objection at trial, the 
appellate court applies the harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The State will not be able to meet its burden that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perry at 227. 
IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ortiz-Perez Motion For Directed Verdict On 
Count Three, Carrying A Concealed Weapon, Because Insufficient Evidence Existed To 
Prove The Material Element That Mr. Ortiz-Perez Did Not Have A Concealed Weapons 
Permit 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motions for 
directed verdict, as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to convict him of 
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. As there was 
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insufficient evidence, Mr. Ortiz-Perez respectfully requests that his conviction be 
vacated. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ortiz-Perez's Motions For Judgment 
Of Acquittal Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motions for 
directed verdict as the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to sustain the 
jury's guilty verdict of concealing a dangerous weapon. Mr. Ortiz-Perez was charged by 
Information with one count of concealing a dangerous weapon. (R., pp.31-34.) At trial, 
after the State rested, defense counsel motioned the district court for directed verdict. 
(Tr., p.663, Ls.16-20.) Mr. Ortiz-Perez based his motion on the lack of evidence proving 
that he did not have a license to carry a concealed weapons as required by State v. 
Morales, 127 Idaho 951 (Ct. App. 1996). (Tr., p.663, L.16-p.664, L.2.) 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 29(a): 
[t]he court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the 
entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the 
indictment, information or complaint after the evidence on either side is 
closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense 
or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close 
of the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the defendant may 
offer evidence. 
I.C.R. 29(a). 
In State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 26 P.3d 53 (Ct. App. 2001), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated when reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal 
pursuant to I.C.R. 29(a), the record is freely reviewed, taking all inferences in favor of 
the State in determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the 
conviction. Id. at 873, 26 P.3d at 56 (citations omitted). An appellate court 
independently considers evidence in the record to determine "whether a reasonable 
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mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the 
offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt," with all reasonable inferences taken in 
favor of the State. Id. (citations omitted). The reviewing court will not substitute its 
view "for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
"The State bears the burden of proving that a person ... is not licensed to carry 
a concealed weapon." State v. Morales, 127 Idaho 951,954 (Ct. App. 1996). Proving 
that a person failed to have a permit to carry a concealed weapon is an integral part of 
the offense and, therefore, a material element of the crime. Id. at 954. Thus, in order to 
prove a criminal violation, the prosecution could elicit testimony from the custodian of 
the concealed weapons permit at the Idaho State Police that the defendant did not have 
a concealed weapon permit on file. See id. 
Here, taking all inferences in favor of the State, it cannot be said that substantial 
evidence was elicited to support Mr. Ortiz-Perez's conviction for concealing a 
dangerous weapon. In the instant case, the State failed to meet its burden of proof 
because it only demonstrated that dispatch did not tell Officer Norman that Mr. Ortiz-
Perez possessed a concealed weapons permit. The State failed to meet its burden of 
proving the necessary element that Mr. Ortiz-Perez is not licensed to carry a concealed 
weapon. Therefore, Mr. Ortiz-Perez respectfully requests that the order of Judgment of 
Conviction be vacated because the district court should have granted his directed 
verdict motions. 
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V. 
Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities During 
Trial, Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the 
accumulation of errors that occurred during trial in the aggregate, was sufficient to 
warrant a new trial. 
B. Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities 
During The Trial, Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that based on the fact that numerous substantial errors 
occurred in his trial, the doctrine of cumulative error applies to his case, and reversal of 
his conviction is mandated. The argument and authority in support of the assertion that 
error occurred are set forth in sections I, II, III, and IV of the brief and are incorporated 
by reference herein. 
In State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504 (Ct. App. 2001), the Court stated that under 
the doctrine of cumulative error, the, "accumulation of irregularities, each of which in 
itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Id. at 
508, 37 P.3d at 5 (citations omitted). Mr. Ortiz-Perez asserts that the errors which 
occurred throughout his trial were not individually harmless. However, assuming 
arguendo that this Court finds that they were, the accumulation of the errors and 
irregularities that took place negated his right to a fair trial and thus, mandate that his 
convictions be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ortiz-Perez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 2012. 
DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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